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A Critique of John McNeill, S. J. and 
Gregory Baum, o. S. A. on the 
Subiect of Homosexuality 
John F. Harvey, O.S.F.S. 
You may wonder why I have 
chosen to treat only two writers 
on the subject of homosexuality. 
It is my experience that John J . 
McNeill, S.J. and Gregory Baum, 
O.S.A. are regarded by gay Cath-
olics as offering an alternative 
theology to that of the Church on 
the question of homosexuality. 
Father Harvey is president of 
De Sales Hall School of TheOlogy 
in Hyattsville, Md. He teaches 
courses in pastoral-moral theology 
in the Cluster of Independent 
Theological Schools in metropoli-
tan Washington. Father Harvey 
is a fr eq uent contributor to Lin-
acre. 
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Going beyond the position of 
Charles Curran, who seeks to 
justify faithful homosexual unions 
by his principle of compromise, 
McNeill and Baum do not con-
sider homosexual actions wrong in 
themselves. It is not surprising, 
then, that Dignity, a national or-
ganization of gay Catholics af-
firming that "gays can express 
their sexuality in a manner that is 
consonant with Christ's teaching" 
makes frequent use of two state-
ments of McNeill and Baum. The 
first, "The Homosexual and the 
Church," is an excerpt from the 
keynote address McNeill de-
livered at the first national con-
vention Dignity held in Septem-
ber, 1973 (National Catholic Re-
porter, October 5, 1973, 7-8, 13-
14). The second statement by 
Gregory Baum, "Catholic Homo-
sexuals," appeared in Common-
weal, February 15, 1974, 8-11. 
Let me first describe McNeill's 
position. 
McNeill's m a j 0 l' arguments 
treat (1) the various texts in Holy 
Scripture concerning homosex-
uality and conclude that none of 
the texts contains a clear con-
demnation of faithful homosexual 
union; (2) he also affirms that 
man's radical freedom enters into 
the formation of man's sexual 
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orientation in such a way that 
biological givens, such as the sex 
in which one is born, should not 
be determinative of sexual ac-
tivity. First, let us consider Mc-
Neill's use of Scripture. 
(1) Cautioning that the Scrip-
tures are historically and cultural-
ly limited, McNeill makes refer-
ence to the Genesis account of the 
creation of male and female. He 
cites the traditional view that 
genital human sexuality derives 
its meaning exclusively in terms 
of the relationship of male and 
female in a procreative union. 
Then he questions whether this 
traditional view is really an ex-
pression of God's will, or merely 
the reflection of the needs of the 
primitive human community. He 
suggests that with some theo-
logians we should read Genesis 
with a new perspective: The 
Genesis account of the origin of 
man and woman and marriage is a 
myth, expressing an ideal for the 
future rather than an event of the 
past. 
"The Garden of Eden in which 
man found himself perfectly at one 
with himself and his sexuality, his 
fellow man, nature, and God repre-
sents primitive man's primordial 
dream of what ought to be in the 
future which he projected into the 
past as a state he once possessed 
and lost and now must work to re-
gain. From this perspective ideal 
human sexual relationships are not 
to be sought in the past, but must 
be created for the future. And the 
key to that future is man's ideal 
human nature which represents not 
so much a static given from the past 
but a dynamic ideal process of 
growth and development." (p. 7) 
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(2) McNeill believes that the 
Genesis account represents vari-
ous aspects of the then mono-
gamous agrarian family unit. (a) 
It reflects the need of a paternal-
istic society to reflect male su-
periority; (b) like other accounts 
of sexuality in Old Testament and 
New, itis fearful of Canaanite and 
other idolatrous sexual practices. 
Turning to the Code of Leviticus 
condemn a tions of homosexual 
acts, McNeill sees it as an expres-
sion of the Jewish horror of the 
meaning of sodomy, namely, it 
was the common practice in the 
Middle East to submit a captured 
foe to sodomy. (Homosexual ac-
tivity then was an expression of 
domination, contempt and scorn.) 
The Jewish male population un-
doubtedly suffered this indigna-
tion, and because the dignity of 
the male was of prime importance 
to this society, it would follow 
that "any activity necessarily as-
sociated with the degradation of 
the male was a serious offense,"l 
McNeill fin d s problematical 
"that what is referred to in Scrip-
ture as homosexuality is either 
not the same reality at all, or that 
the Biblical authors did not mani-
fest the same understanding of 
that reality as we have it today. 
Therefore it can be seriously 
questioned whether what is un-
derstood today as the true homo-
sexual and his activity is ever the 
object of explicit moral condem-
nation in the scriptures." 
After all, McNeill continues, 
biblical writers were not familiar 
with the distinction bet wee n 
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homosexual 0 ri en t a ti 0 nand 
homosexual activity, and could 
not have reasoned to the conclu-
sion that a homosexually oriented 
person should be allowed to en-
gage in homosexual activity. For 
this reason, even in the one pas-
sage which McNeill finds in the 
New Testament (Romans 1:26-
27) as referring clearly to homo-
sexual activity, he sees no con-
de m nat ion of contemporary 
homosexual unions. He believes 
Paul understood the Greeks who 
indulged in homosexual activity 
to be heterosexuals involved in 
homosexual activities, probably 
forms of the sacred prostitution 
so often condemned III the Old 
Testament. 
From his study of biblical 
scholars on human sexuality Mc-
Neill concludes that the primary 
message of the Old Testament is 
that "love, including sexual love, 
requires respect for the other per-
son as well." The sin which man 
can commit in his sexual conduct 
with another consists in dishonor-
ing the person of a fellow human 
being. In the N,ew Testament the 
writers teach the need to inte-
grate sexual powers into one's to-
tal personality within the context 
of free, interpersonal love. 
Author's Critique 
Critique: While I believe that 
the Scriptures are not the only 
source of our teaching on homo-
sexuality, they are important for 
our understanding of sexuality in 
general and homosexuality in par-
ticular. McNeill's use of Scripture 
presents many difficulties. Were 
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one to grant for the sake of the 
argument that the Genesis ac-
count was an ideal representation 
of a future condition, an ideal to 
be striven for, it is significant that 
the biblical account is concerned 
with the man-woman relation-
ship. The G en e sis accounts 
(chapters 2, 3) have been regard-
ed as both an ideal and norm of 
sexual behavior, and the sexual 
behavior is heterosexual. Mat-
thew's reference to this norm 
(Matthew 19: 1-9) strengthens 
the argument that Genesis taught 
a heterosexual norm of sexuality 
in permanent marriage. The au-
thor of Matthew quotes both 
Genesis 1:27 and 2:24: (Jesus) 
answered: "Have you not read 
that the creator from the begin-
ning made them male and female , 
and that he said: This is why a 
man must leave father and moth-
er, and cling to his wife, and the 
two become one body? They are 
no longer two therefore, but one 
body. So then what God has 
united, man must not divide." 
(J erusalem Bible translation) 
Again, in the Genesis accounts 
it is said that man was created as 
male and female (Genesis 1:27) 
and that it was not good that 
man should be alone. At this 
point, however, God did not cre-
ate another man but a woman. 
Surely, the Genesis account says 
something about the complemen-
tary nature of man and woman.2 
Another argument used by Mc-
Neill throughout his discussion of 
scriptural references is that sex-
ual norms are determined exclu-
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sively by cultural factors: Jewish 
and Christian marriages were 
structured to assure male domi-
nation. Homosexual acts were 
condemned, because they were 
forms of prostitution rites, or 
painful reminders of humiliation 
by the captors of the Israelites. 
And so forth. It can be argued 
against this kind of speculation 
that the authors of the sacred 
books, beginning with the Genesis 
account of marriage, intended to 
affirm c e r t a i n transcendental 
principles concerning human sex-
uality and marriage. If this were 
not so, how could the author of 
Matthew, 19, 1-9, refer back to 
the pristine integrity of marriage? 
On another occasion why 'would 
Jesus say that divorce was not 
prevalent in the beginning, but 
was a concession due to the hard-
ness of men's hearts? (Mark 
10: 2-12.) 
This is not to say that every-
thing which is said about sexuali-
ty in the Old Testament is of 
permanent value. One recognizes 
the prescriptions of Leviticus 
(15: 19-30) concerning the men-
struating woman as a purely cul-
tural determinant. In accepting 
the cultural milieu of Genesis and 
other books of the Bible we do 
not deny that they also contain 
certain perennial principles, such 
as the norm of heterosexual mar-
riage. 
It would be a mistake to dem-
onstrate the heterosexual norm 
of marriage from individual texts 
when the context of both the Old 
Testament and the New stress 
the complementary relationship 
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of man and woman.3 Nowhere in 
Holy Scripture is the homosexual 
person condemned, but always the 
action is condemned. Nowhere is 
there any approval of homosexual 
unions, but the heterosexual un-
ion of man and wife is confirmed 
from Genesis to Ephesians as a 
perennial principle. While Holy 
Scripture does not say the last 
word about homosexuality, it 
gives no support to such actions. 
As already mentioned, McNeill 
interprets all the specific texts re-
ferring to homosexual activity in 
terms of a relationship to prosti-
tution cults. Prescinding from the 
Leviticus texts in the Old Testa-
ment, and the other references in 
the New, one wonders how one 
can prove that in Romans 1:26-27 
homosexual acts were condemned 
only because they happened in 
the background of deliberate re-
pudiation of God, or because it 
happened to be Greek heterosex-
uals performing homosexual ac-
tivities. He draws the conclusion 
that the men were heterosexuals 
because of the active aorist par-
ticiple, aphentes, men giving up 
their natural relations with wom-
en. He does not explain St. Paul's 
reference to women making use 
of other women. This is hardly a 
convincing proof. Really, McNeill 
cannot have it both ways. In one 
place he argues that biblical au-
thors condemn homosexual ac-
tions, because of their association 
with sacred prostitution rites, 
while they do not condemn the 
interior disposition toward homo-
sexuality; but, on the other hand, 
McN eill argues on the basis of a 
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grammatical phrase (aphentes) 
that Paul was condemning heter-
osexual Greeks performing homo-
sexual actions. It has been as-
sumed by McNeill that biblical 
authors knew nothing about the 
interior dispositions of the homo-
sexual. 
In summing up his understand-
ing of Scripture and homosexuali-
ty McNeill asserts correctly the 
primacy of love in both Testa-
ments, and hence the need for 
mutual respect. But his attempt 
to show that a faithful homo-
sexual couple fulfills these ideals 
of Scripture is weak in the ab-
sence of any supporting scriptural 
texts dealing with the matter at 
hand. 
Personal Uniqueness 
(2) In his treatment of human 
nature and human freedom, Mc-
Neill stresses that every individ-
ual is more than the species, and 
that each human being has a per-
sonal uniqueness. If a loving ac-
tion takes the form of a sexual 
gesture it must be directed to the 
other person as unique, and as an 
end in himself or herself. Too 
much emphasis on procreation 
can lead to a dehumanizing form 
of sexuality. As he puts it, "There 
is something more to the question 
of the moral quality of sexual be-
havior than purely the objective 
legal question of marriage or the 
objective rational question of 
ope nne s s to procreation-that 
something else is -love." 
McNeill posits that human sex-
uality, like all human reality, par-
ticipates "in the radical freedom 
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of man" precisely because it is 
human. 
Many theologians ignore the 
fact that sexuality is not a totally 
instinctive determined phenome-
non. Human freedom, however, 
cannot receive its total explana-
tion in terms of causal determi-
nacy, but only in terms of ideal 
goals and purposes. Since man 
can project ideal goals, man can 
allow these goals to be the ulti-
mate determining factor in his be-
havior. 
He goes on to argue that man 
can use his bodily organs in many 
creative ways. He uses his mouth, 
which is obviously intended for 
eating, in order to communicate 
his innermost sentiments; like-
wise, he can use his sexual organs, 
designed by nature for procrea-
tion, in order to give the most 
intimate personal expression of 
his drive for union in love with a 
fellow human. The point is that 
man has the freedom to decide 
how he will use his powers. 
McNeill explains how man's 
freedom enters into the formation 
of his sexual orientation. Biologi-
cal givens (one's physical sexuali-
ty) do not determine human 
behavior precisely as it exists on 
the human level. What we are in 
our society, or in any other so-
ciety, is a free cultural creation. 
For each culture creates its own 
ideal identity images from the 
masculine and feminine roles. 
That is-why the young undergo a 
process through which they adapt 
themselves to the prevailing cul-
tural images and expectations, 
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which are in agreement with their 
biological identity. Although in 
the past theologians have mis-
takenly identified such cultural 
images as divine givens, in more 
recent times they have been able 
to identify such images as deter-
mined purely by particular cul-
tures. 
In this context Jesus is seen 
as the great liberator from sexual 
taboos. (McNeill does not identi-
fy these taboos, nor does he show 
how Jesus liberates us from 
them.) He concludes that the 
sexual identity images which con-
cretize heterosexual relationships 
at any point in human history are 
human creations; and that any 
effort to insist that they come 
forth from God's will is to raise a 
human creation to the level of 
idolatry. Theologians then should 
make a critical investigation of 
sexual identity images. If they do 
so, they will discover that as a 
result of our identifying with the 
heterosexual identity images, we 
have accepted as the form of 
heterosexual relationships that of 
the master-slave, in which the 
male seeks to dominate, and the 
female seeks to be dominated. 
Such a relationship is contrary 
to ideal Christian love, which can 
exist only if both persons see 
themselves as equals. The pri-
mary goal, then, of human sexual 
development is that "we should 
fashion cultural identity images 
that make it possible for human 
beings to achieve the fullness of a 
true personal relationship in the 
process of conforming to the 
images provided by society." 
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According to McNeill, then, 
ideal human nature lies in the fu-
ture, and to the development of 
this ideal man must be directed: a 
free, mature person living in a ma-
ture, interpersonal community. 
Then a homosexual relationship 
will be viewed as a truly construc-
tive and mature expression of hu-
man love. 
Following Gustav Jung's analy-
sis of positive traits in the homo-
sexual, McNeill concludes: 
"Each of the specia l qualities 
Jung attributes to the homosexual 
community is usually considered as 
a striking characteristic of Christ-
the qualities which distinguished 
him from the ordinary man. The 
ability to meet the individual as a 
person apart from stereotypes and 
cultural prejudices. the refusal to 
establish his identity and accom-
plish his mission by means of vio-
lence. the image of himself as the 
loving servant of all humanity." 
McNeill asks that we be pre-
pared to meet every individual 
person on his or her own merits 
without allowing ourselves to be 
blinded by stereotypes. The tend-
ency of both heterosexuals and 
homosexuals to define themselves 
in contrast to one another leads 
to a "narrow and impoverished 
self-image for both parties." Man 
should be free to develop all the 
qualities belonging to the fullness 
of person. 
McNeill's Concept of Freedom 
Critique of McNeill: To under-
stand McNeill one needs to ex-
amine his concept of freedom, 
which he derives from Blondel. In 
several other articles4 he contrasts 
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the traditional notion of freedom 
with that of Blondel. In the tra-
ditional concept man exists and 
then he acts. "All actions are con-
sidered as functions which can 
only influence that unchanging 
reality on the phenomenal or ac-
cidental level of substantial de-
termination."s In the Blondelian 
conception, however, man's free-
dom must be understood beyond 
all particular actions as the radi-
cal self-positing of his own reality. 
Man must exist at every mo-
ment as a consequence of his free-
dom. "If in the depths of his own 
subjective being man meets with 
any determinism wha tsoever-
biological, psychological, social, or 
even a determinism springing 
from the divine will, a determin-
ism which lies radically outside 
his free ability to determine him-
self-then one must be forced to 
accept the conclusion that the ex-
istence of an individual human 
being as such is an illusion."" 
The law is within us, and we can-
not escape it, whether we con-
form to it freely or oppose it 
freely. 
McNeill accepts as a first prin-
ciple of moral activity Blondel's 
understanding of freedom, which 
he quotes: "There is no being 
where there is only constraint. If 
I am not that which I will to be I 
am not. At the very core of my 
being there is a will and a love of 
being or there is nothing. If man's 
freedom is real, it is necesssary 
that one has at present or at least 
in the future a knowledge and a 
will sufficient never to suffer any 
tyranny whatsoever."7 
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McNeill logically accepts the 
Blondelian principle of imman-
ence: 
"Nothing can impose itself on a 
man, nothing can demand the as-
sent of his intellect or the consent 
of his will, which does not in some 
way find its source in m an him-
self."7a 
Thus, accepting these premises, 
McNeill draws the conclusion 
that whatever we are as men in 
this present society is a free cul-
tural creation. In the circum-
stances of his life and culture man 
creates his own freedom. At the 
same time McNeill admits the 
strong cultural influences which 
shape a child from earliest years. 
He also acknowledges that his 
freedom is "dependent upon a 
transcendent truth, to which it 
must conform and is directed to 
values which, far from being his 
exclusive creation serve him as 
guide, norm, and sanction."R Re-
ferring to Blondel, he resolves the 
relationship between transcend-
ence and immanence by the phi-
losophy of action: 
"Action has its own a priori struc-
ture from which the totality of 
thought derives its meaning and 
structure. . . . Accordingly, he 
changed the centra l structure of 
philosophy from thought as analytic 
to action as synthetic. . . . His 
search for mora l principles is there-
fore an endeavor to discover the 
all-encompassing dialectical I a w 
that immanently governs the evo-
lution of huma n life."9 
One exercises his freedom by 
responding to ideals, which are 
not imposed from without, but 
arise within consciousness: 
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"The m etaphysical order is not 
outside the will as a n extraneous 
end to be a t tained, but is conta ined 
within the will as a means to move 
beyond. It does not represent a 
truth already cons tituted in fac t, 
but presents to thought what one 
wishes to will, tha t is, a n idea l ob-
ject .. . . M a n is the reby free from 
a ll predeterminism. "10 
In free action one synthesizes 
the real and the ideal, and there-
by discovers his moral principles. 
A communion with God is possi-
ble through union with Jesus 
Christ. Man can make a free com-
mitment to both God and fellow-
man.11 
Once one has grasped McNeill's 
acceptance of Blondel's thought, 
he can see why McNeill rejects 
the traditional position of the 
Church on objective standards of 
morality_ Any sexual action by a 
loving person is a unique action 
not measurable by any extrinsic 
norm. Sharing in the radical free-
dom of man, this action derives 
its morality from the ideals which 
arise within the will of the person 
himself. Thus, as long as a sexual 
act is free, loving, and creative, it 
is good; the biological and in-
stinctive elements of the sexual 
act determine in no way its moral 
goodness or evil. 
McNeill, then, holds that all 
moral authority comes from with-
in the person himself as he reaches 
out to grasp transcendental truth. 
This presupposes a process of 
growth in the person in all areas 
of development including the sex-
ual. In the homosexual, according 
to McNeill, it often begins with 
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promiscuous sex and advances 
over a long period of time to a 
mature, loving relationship, which 
is characterized by love and trust_ 
Implicitly, contrary to his own 
theory of freedom, however, Mc-
Neill presupposes that the homo-
sexual has been determined in his 
orientation toward his own sex 
by myriad influences in early life. 
He regards this learned inclina-
tion as connatural to him; and so 
he seeks the same kind of fidelity 
from his chosen beloved as man 
and woman should do in mar-
riage. Just as sexual intimacy be-
tween two heterosexual persons is 
considered as an expression of 
union, so sexual actions between 
two homosexual lovers is meant to 
be an expression of 'their com-
mitted love. 
In contrast to traditional Chris-
tian teaching McNeill makes the 
homosexual union the alternative 
to marriage. It is meant only for 
those homosexually oriented. It 
presupposes an earlier experi -
mental period (promiscuity) fol-
lowed by faithful union. Apart 
from Roman Catholic teaching on 
marriage, the homosexual com-
munity by and large does not ac-
cept even the ideal of faithful 
homosexual union . 
Summary of Gregory Baum_ 
COlllmonweal, February 15, 1974, 
8-11. 
Baum contends that the Catho-
lic theologian has become sus-
picious of the old arguments 
about human nature. Perhaps 
what a particular culture calls 
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"human nature" is merely the 
self-understanding of the domi-
nant class; and the perpetuation 
of that self-understanding tends 
to extend the power of the class. 
For this reason, "the theologian 
must try to discern in the inheri-
ted, historically constituted hu-
man nature the possible struc-
tures of oppression, legitimating 
various forms of what Hegel has 
called master-slave relationships." 
(p. 9) 
Baum speaks of God's judg-
ment enabling him to discern the 
structures of evil in this world. 
This judgment rests upon man's 
historically constituted nature, 
which appears to be mutuality: 
"What is normative for normal 
life is the human nature to which 
we are divinely summoned, which 
is defined in terms of mutuality. 
This, at least, is the promise of 
biblical religion." (p. 9) Further 
in the article Baum describes mu-
tuality as friendship. He sets 
down a new norm by which to 
evaluate the morality of homo-
sexual relationships, namely, mu-
tuality. This means that a homo-
sexual relationship is good if it 
grounds a friendship which "en-
ables the partners to grow and to 
become more truly human. . . . 
For the structure of redeemed life 
is mutuality." (p. 10) 
Baum realizes that there are 
damaged forms of sexuality which 
do not admit of mutuality: sad-
ism, masochism, and paedophilia. 
They do not fulfill the ideal of 
mutuality to which God summons 
us. While recognizing that some 
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psychiatrists and psychologists do 
not believe that a homosexual re-
lationship can fulfill the norm of 
mutuality, Baum holds that theo-
logians should take seriously" the 
witness of homosexual men and 
women who have struggled for 
self-knowledge and transcended 
the weight society has put on 
them and who tell us that their 
lives are based on mutuality." 
(p. 10) From the specific witness 
of Christians and Catholics who 
have sustained lasting homosex-
ual relationships the theologian 
may draw the conclusion that 
constitutive homosexuals "must 
accept their orientation and live 
accordingly. Homosexual love, 
then, is not contrary to the hu-
man nature, defined in terms of 
mutuality, toward which mankind 
is summoned." (p. 10) 
Some Unproven Assertions 
Before evaluating Baum's posi-
tion it is profitable to note some 
of his unproven assertions. When 
he speaks of an historically con-
stituted human nature, he is as-
serting that human nature at any 
given time is constituted exclu-
sively from the elements of a par-
ticular culture; he asserts also 
that human nature as generally 
understood by scholastic philoso-
phy is so entangled with dehu-
manizing elements which have 
been woven into our culture that 
it is no longer an operative moral 
norm. Yet· the only example he 
gives of these dehumanizing ele-
ments is the tradition affirming 
the superiority of the male, or the 
master-slave relationship. He also 
173 
asserts that the long standing tra-
dition against homosexuality is an 
example of the cruelty of the 
heterosexual culture. The conse-
quence of the hostility of the 
majority is the placing of an un-
speakable burden on homosex-
uals. The burden takes the form 
of self-hatred. The homosexual 
learns to hate himself in the same 
way he feels society hates him, 
and he becomes full of self-loath-
ing. Theologians, then, should 
seek new ground for moral norms, 
because the traditional arguments 
arise from a cruel culture. 
Baum is aware of the distinc-
tion between temporary and con-
stitutive homosexuality. He refers 
to the former "as a phase to be 
passed through" and the latter as 
"a constant to be lived with." (p. 
10. Italics author's) He is con-
cerned with the question wheth-
er the constitutive homosexual 
should be allowed to express him-
self genitally. He is convinced 
that such an expression cannot be 
proven to be immoral, because the 
concept of human nature and the 
relationship between man and 
woman have become problematic 
in the writings of some moral 
theologians, who are not specified. 
Thus, he seeks a new norm to 
evaluate morally homosexual re-
lationships, and he finds it in mu-
tuality, or true friendship. 
Author's Critique 
Critique of Baum: As already 
pointed out, Baum does not prove 
sweeping assertions about the 
constitution of human nature. He 
presupposes that society's at-
174 
titude toward homosexuals is the 
major cause of whatever neurosis 
the person may have. This is con-
trary to sound psychiatric opin-
ion.12 This is not to deny that the 
self-hatred found in the homo-
sexual is in part a reflection of 
the attitude of hatred found in 
society toward the homosexual. 
Baum's choice of mutuality as a 
norm of human sexuality ignores 
other varied and complex aspects 
of sexuality, such as procreation 
and procreative longing, mother-
hood, fatherhood, and family-
stability. He does not treat the 
Scriptural teaching on sexuality 
or homosexuality. On the basis of 
his own understanding of the in-
terplay between human nature 
and the prevailing culture, he 
chooses the norm of mutuality for 
sexual actions. Since his norm is 
not comprehensive enough to take 
in all the known elements of sex-
uality, and does not give an ac-
count of scriptural teaching, it is 
inadequate. 
Summary 
There are a series of weak 
points in both approaches: (1) If 
the norm is purely subjective, and 
divorced from the history of man, 
it will not be able to see the full 
reality of man as he has learned 
from historical experience. Why 
should Baum's perception of mo-
rality as mutuality displace more 
nuanced norms which take into 
account not only man's subjective 
condition, but also the structure 
of human society, the structure of 
human acts, one person in rela-
tionship to another person and to 
society? (2) On the scriptural 
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question Baum does not really 
treat it; McNeill interprets the 
pertinent passages on the con-
demnation of homosexuality in 
such a way as to render them all 
non-applicable to the homosexual 
in the faithful union. (3) The 
concentration of both McNeill 
and Baum on the situation of the 
faithful homosexual union is quite 
disproportionate when you con-
sider that the vast majority of 
homosexuals do not desire and 
do not seek this kind of union. 
Moral Theology is supposed to 
evaluate per se situations more 
than it does per accidens prob-
lems. Granted theologians con-
sider both kinds, but more atten-
tion should be given to the typical 
behavior of the typical homosex-
ual. (4) In psychiatry the idea of 
the constitutive homosexual, that 
is to say, the person who is per-
manently oriented in this direc-
tion is not universally accepted. 13 
It is premature to say that there 
is very little hope that future 
study will not reveal ways of help-
ing some homosexuals to change 
the direction of their sexual in-
stincts. (5) No consideration is 
given to the alternative life style 
of perpetual continence, motivat-
ed by the love of God, and ex-
pressed in service to neighbor. 
There are many other problems 
in this phenomenon which de-
mand research-problems both in 
psychology and in morality. We 
need the patience to probe them. 
Appendix to Critique of 
McNeill and Baum 
Since completion of my critique 
of McNeill and Baum the Sacred 
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Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith has issued its "Declara-
tion on Certain Questions Con-
cerning Sexual Ethics" (January 
1976) in which Church teaching 
concerning the morality of homo-
sexual actions is reaffirmed. Reaf-
firmed, however, within a pastoral 
context, which exhorts pastors to 
treat homosexuals with under-
standing, helping them to over-
come difficulties and to relate to 
both heterosexuals and homosex-
uals. As is usually the case when 
the Church issues a statement on 
sexual ethics, it is roundly de-
nounced by some secular and re-
ligious writers, and, at the same 
time, it is applauded in other sec-
tors of the Catholic press, par-
ticularly L'Osservatore Romano. 14 
Rather than to review these pub-
lications I prefer to comment 
briefly on that part of the Dec-
laration which considers homo-
sexuality. (paragraph 8) 
Significantly, the Declaration 
does not pose as an authority on 
the different kinds of homosex-
uals, but merely summarizes con-
temporary psychological thought. 
I t follows a distinction commonly 
accepted, namely, that between 
transitory and apparently irre-
versible homosexual tendencies. 
It is on the latter form, so-called 
incurable or constitutional homo-
sexuality, that the Declaration 
comments. People in this second 
category tend to conclude that 
their condition is so natural that 
faithful homosexual relationships, 
analogous to marriage, are justi-
fied as the only way of escaping a 
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solitary life. The Declaration 
shows understanding of this feel-
ing in homosexuals, but does not 
justify even the so-called faithful 
union. Homosexual :actions lack 
"an · essential and indispensable 
finality," .i.e., they fail to signify 
both the unitive and procreational 
meanings of genital acts-mean-
ings which are inherent in the 
acts, apart from the intentions of 
the participants. " ... Homosex-
ual acts are intrinsically disor-
dered." So much for the basic 
content of this paragraph. Now 
some personal reflections: 
1. The Declaration says that 
the culpability of homosexual ac-
tions should be judged by the rule 
of prudence, which in this con-
text indicates that imputability 
under stress is diminished consid-
erably. In no way does it imply 
that homosexuals are not suffi-
ciently free to be responsible for 
their actions, but, on the con-
trary, presupposes that there are 
ways of helping the homosexual 
to increase the degree of freedom 
and to reduce the degree of com-
pulsion. ls 
2. The Declaration avoids any 
attempt at complete analysis of 
the causes of homosexuality, tem-
porary or permanent, because we 
simply do not know them. Unfor-
tunately, however, it seems to 
adopt the notion that some homo-
sexuals are set in this direction 
because of "some kind of innate 
instinct."1 6 While the beginnings 
of homosexuality are seen to be in 
very early childhood-at least 
this seems to be the growing opin-
ion-the tendency itself is not re-
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garded as innateY Far more than 
instinct, moreover, seems to be in-
volved in the formation of per-
manent homosexual tendencies. I R 
Even the adjective permanent 
must not be taken in any abso-
lute sense. Again, the Declara-
tion's reference to "pathological 
constitution" is infelicitous. Ad-
vocates of faithful homosexual 
unions will argue from such 
phraseology to the conclusion 
that one has no choice but to ex-
press "innate instinct" in the 
most acceptable love relationship 
possible.1 9 
3. They would also add that the 
majority of the members of the 
American Psychiatric Association 
have voted to remove homosex-
uality from the categories of psy-
chosis and neurosis, and therefore 
do not regard the condition as 
pathological. Some recognition of 
the debate which preceded and 
followed the vote would have 
avoided the impression that the 
authors of the Declaration were 
not aware of current psychologi-
cal thinking. Terms like "serious-
ly disordered" and "intrinsically 
disordered" should not be con-
fused by the unwary reader with 
psychological language like "in-
nate instinct" and "pathological 
constitution." Intrinsic disorder 
is an ethical term, meaning that 
something is lacking in one of 
man's basic relationships to God 
or to other men; pathological con-
stitution, however, is a presuppo-
sition in psychological theory that 
a person inherits serious disori-
entations in cognitive or emo-
tional patterns. 
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3. Concerning the use of Scrip-
ture in the Declaration's para-
graph on homosexuality: The au-
thors would have done better to 
use the Scriptural teaching on 
marriage, particularly as it is ex-
pressed in Genesis, 1, 2 and in 
Ephesians, 5, 21-33, as its basis 
for condemnation of homosexual 
acts. Having pursued this line of 
argument in other places,2° I will 
merely state that the doctrine of 
the Church on marriage, as ex-
pressed in "The Church in the 
Modern World," nn. 47-52, and in 
"Humanae Vitae," nn. 7-16, re-
flect the constant tradition of the 
Church against homosexual ac-
tions. Just as nowhere in Holy 
Scripture are homosexual actions 
approved, and, wherever men-
tioned, condemned, so nowhere in 
Church teaching are homosexual 
actions approved, and, wherever 
mentioned, condemned. 
4. In its condemnation of homo-
sexual unions between those who 
seem set in their homosexual ori-
entation the Declaration might 
have raised the question concern-
ing fidelity. How exclusive a fi-
delity do homosexual couples 
really intend? It would seem that 
even the lasting unions involve 
the acceptance of a certain 
amount of infidelity on the part 
of either or both partners. Do 
writers who espouse faithful 
homosexual unions project into 
the minds of so-called faithful 
couples an idealism which the ho-
mosexuals really do not have? 
Again, when does a homosexual 
union become "faithful," or what 
are the criteria of fidelity? 
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5. Whether one regards the 
chastity of the irreversible homo-
sexual as charismatic or not, it is 
a fact made possible by the grace 
of God who always gives to man 
sufficient grace to fulfill his com-
mands; and, if we accept the au-
thentic teaching of the Church, 
chastity is mandatory for the 
homosexual, just as it is manda-
tory for many heterosexuals liv-
ing in difficult situations as sin-
gles, or as divorced. That God 
gives sufficient grace to fulfill dif-
ficult commands is a doctrine of 
faith; however, that He gives 
charismata for this or that action 
may be open for discussion and 
disagreement. 2 1 
6. I refer the readers of Linacre 
Quarterly to the "Pastoral: Hu-
man Sexuality" of Bishop Francis 
Mugavero.22 It is written with 
gentleness and hope without com-
promising the teaching of the 
Declaration, while stressing the 
truth that homosexuals share the 
same humanity as heterosexuals, 
and should regard themselves, 
and be regarded by us, as fully 
acceptable to God. On our part, 
we need to do more to describe 
and to defend the civil rights of 
the homosexual. 
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